Books
I too read Leggiere's 'Napoleon and the the struggle for Germany. The Franco-Prussian War of 1813' and can recommend it. It is written from the point of view of the Silesian Army und Blücher, but that does not mean that Leggiere is a Prussian fanboy. It's not an operational study and very often get's down to tactical fights on the battalion level, but it also gives a vivid picture...of the many, many conflicts between Blücher/Gneisenau and the corps leaders of the Silesian army (some due to clashes of personalities, misunderstandings and other due to structural problems of 1813 warfare)of the diplomatic maneuvers between Blücher/Gneisenau and the two other allied armies (not to forget the three monarchs and their military entourage)of the exhaustion and attritional effects when men fight, march and bivouac in (most of the time) terrible weather conditions (Weather in 1813 was extremely bad! )But the best books I have read so far about the 1813 Campaigns are from Rudolf Friederich: "Der Frühjahrsfeldzug 1813" and "Der Herbstfeldzug 1813", two old books, but not outdated (I don't know if there's an English translation) - Friederich was Head of the historic department II in the Prussian Generalstab. Although a Prussian and an admirer of Napoleon, he has - in my opinion - good judgement and gives an apt analysis of the operations, battles and participants of this conflict (Kevin Zucker in his guide to his 1813 Operational Game makes heavy reference to Friederich).In the final chapter of 'Der Herbstfeldzug 1813' the author sums up the two campaigns and explores the reasons why Napoleon got defeated: after discarding some common myths (like old Nappy no longer up to the task, quality of troops, superior allied leadership, crappy marshals), he finds two problems that Napoleon couldn't solve, both have to do with scale:
1)Command & Control (Führung): the theatre of operations and the forces in it become too large/big for Napoleon to command (for example sending Oudinot north and trying to push the marshal towards Berlin without having sufficient intelligence about the strength of the allied forces there - often, when Napoleons very detailed dispatches arrive the situation already had changed..)
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug: "Napoleons masterful skills in operating on interior lines came to nothing because the Army - due to its monstrous strength - had become so cumbersome, that despite the finest art of Napoleonic Marching Technique, it could not be brought where it was needed and exhausted its strength in military efforts intensified to the extreme" ("weil die Armee infolge ihrer übertriebenen Stärke so schwerfällig geworden war, dass sie trotz aller Künste der Napoleonischen Marschtechnik entweder nicht dahin gebracht werden konnte, wo man ihrer bedurfte, oder ihre Kräfte in den bis aufs Äusserste gesteigerten Anstrengungen aufrieb")
Supporting forces had do be brought up to army strength in order to balance the allied forces - often commanded by military leaders not used to independent command (if beaten their defeats neutralized all gains Napoleon made personally)
2) Logistics (Erhaltung der Armee): the troops in the theatre were too numerous and could not adequately be supplied. Although Saxony was a well developed country and could theoretically maintain such a force, it proved increasingly impossible the longer that force did not move and more or less stayed at the same spot
Two Examples:
In the beginning of the autumn campaign (August 1813) about 90.000 - IIRC - of Napoleons troops already out of action and in hospital, many commanders reporting severe shortages of food and fodderIn the Silesian theatre: the desperate hunt for food and fodder influences the decisions on both sides; Blücher breaking the truce (before it ran out the following day) in order to get his army in the neutral zone first, to harvest resources before the French snatch them awayDidn't the Allies have to deal with similar problems? Friederich: yes, but less severe, because:Allied forces divided in 3 Armies operating in 3 theatres (Brandenburg, Silesia, Bohemia), not sharing the same base of operationsNo partisans and activity of Fliegende Corps (allied light Cavalry corps operating in the hinterland)Mostly friendly populationBringing sick and wounded soldiers back to the hinterland for careStill ongoing reinforcements (Napoleon in Summer 1813 mobilized to the maximum)Why did Napoleon suck in 1813?According to Friederich Napoleon made no grave mistake in 1813, but he made little ones that added up (he mentions: offensive against Berlin with too weak a force and an ill-suited commander, giving up on the pincer movement south of Dresden - leaving Vandamme exposed, insufficient pursuit after victory at Dresden, holding his position for too long at the right bank of the Elbe, leaving Saint-Cyr at Dresden),Friederich also claims that the so called 'Trachenberg Plan' (in its modified form) didn't influence the real behavior of the three army commanders in a noticeable way (I disagree*), according to Friederich their success came down to a lucky combination of leader personalities, including - and above all - their flaws and often old-fashioned 18th Century doctrines, which made them avoid any decisive battle until Leipzig (16-19 October):"The Warfare of the Allies presents us with a rather unpleasant picture, so it comes that we, despite repeated defeats of the French, never get the impression of skillful superiority on the side of the Allies, that we cannot suppress a tragic feeling that a genius in the end only succumbed to the dominance of clumsy masses ("dass wir trotz der fortgesetzten Niederlagen der Franzosen, nirgends das Gefühl der inneren Überlegenheit der Verbündeten erhalten, (...) dass wir sogar das Mitgefühl über das Tragische nicht zu unterdrücken vermögen, das Genie schliesslich dem blossen Übergewicht plumper Massen unterliegen zu sehen")
*At least Blücher/Gneisenau - ironically - followed that plan, almost to a t.
My take: I cannot find that Napoleon really made a severe misstep, he just could not find something to counter the allied strategy: running away from him, ganging up on his marshals, forcing him to fruitless marches and thereby wearing him down, until they got him trapped at Leipzig (= the modified so called Trachenberg Plan, presumably agreed in the last weeks bevor outbreak of hostilities in August; it never was written down). So the Allies denied him the decisive blow he was craving for. Napoleon calculated that 2 month would be plenty of time for that, even if he would be cut off from his lines of communication, but in the end time was running out for him (the force ratio in August was almost 1:1, in October almost down to 1:2)
1)Command & Control (Führung): the theatre of operations and the forces in it become too large/big for Napoleon to command (for example sending Oudinot north and trying to push the marshal towards Berlin without having sufficient intelligence about the strength of the allied forces there - often, when Napoleons very detailed dispatches arrive the situation already had changed..)
Friederich, Herbstfeldzug: "Napoleons masterful skills in operating on interior lines came to nothing because the Army - due to its monstrous strength - had become so cumbersome, that despite the finest art of Napoleonic Marching Technique, it could not be brought where it was needed and exhausted its strength in military efforts intensified to the extreme" ("weil die Armee infolge ihrer übertriebenen Stärke so schwerfällig geworden war, dass sie trotz aller Künste der Napoleonischen Marschtechnik entweder nicht dahin gebracht werden konnte, wo man ihrer bedurfte, oder ihre Kräfte in den bis aufs Äusserste gesteigerten Anstrengungen aufrieb")
Supporting forces had do be brought up to army strength in order to balance the allied forces - often commanded by military leaders not used to independent command (if beaten their defeats neutralized all gains Napoleon made personally)
2) Logistics (Erhaltung der Armee): the troops in the theatre were too numerous and could not adequately be supplied. Although Saxony was a well developed country and could theoretically maintain such a force, it proved increasingly impossible the longer that force did not move and more or less stayed at the same spot
Two Examples:
In the beginning of the autumn campaign (August 1813) about 90.000 - IIRC - of Napoleons troops already out of action and in hospital, many commanders reporting severe shortages of food and fodderIn the Silesian theatre: the desperate hunt for food and fodder influences the decisions on both sides; Blücher breaking the truce (before it ran out the following day) in order to get his army in the neutral zone first, to harvest resources before the French snatch them awayDidn't the Allies have to deal with similar problems? Friederich: yes, but less severe, because:Allied forces divided in 3 Armies operating in 3 theatres (Brandenburg, Silesia, Bohemia), not sharing the same base of operationsNo partisans and activity of Fliegende Corps (allied light Cavalry corps operating in the hinterland)Mostly friendly populationBringing sick and wounded soldiers back to the hinterland for careStill ongoing reinforcements (Napoleon in Summer 1813 mobilized to the maximum)Why did Napoleon suck in 1813?According to Friederich Napoleon made no grave mistake in 1813, but he made little ones that added up (he mentions: offensive against Berlin with too weak a force and an ill-suited commander, giving up on the pincer movement south of Dresden - leaving Vandamme exposed, insufficient pursuit after victory at Dresden, holding his position for too long at the right bank of the Elbe, leaving Saint-Cyr at Dresden),Friederich also claims that the so called 'Trachenberg Plan' (in its modified form) didn't influence the real behavior of the three army commanders in a noticeable way (I disagree*), according to Friederich their success came down to a lucky combination of leader personalities, including - and above all - their flaws and often old-fashioned 18th Century doctrines, which made them avoid any decisive battle until Leipzig (16-19 October):"The Warfare of the Allies presents us with a rather unpleasant picture, so it comes that we, despite repeated defeats of the French, never get the impression of skillful superiority on the side of the Allies, that we cannot suppress a tragic feeling that a genius in the end only succumbed to the dominance of clumsy masses ("dass wir trotz der fortgesetzten Niederlagen der Franzosen, nirgends das Gefühl der inneren Überlegenheit der Verbündeten erhalten, (...) dass wir sogar das Mitgefühl über das Tragische nicht zu unterdrücken vermögen, das Genie schliesslich dem blossen Übergewicht plumper Massen unterliegen zu sehen")
*At least Blücher/Gneisenau - ironically - followed that plan, almost to a t.
My take: I cannot find that Napoleon really made a severe misstep, he just could not find something to counter the allied strategy: running away from him, ganging up on his marshals, forcing him to fruitless marches and thereby wearing him down, until they got him trapped at Leipzig (= the modified so called Trachenberg Plan, presumably agreed in the last weeks bevor outbreak of hostilities in August; it never was written down). So the Allies denied him the decisive blow he was craving for. Napoleon calculated that 2 month would be plenty of time for that, even if he would be cut off from his lines of communication, but in the end time was running out for him (the force ratio in August was almost 1:1, in October almost down to 1:2)
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